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Abstract 
The development of technologies for accurate field-scale carbon assessment allows 
the implementation of more efficient policies than can be implemented in their absence.  
We estimate the value of accurate measurement technology by estimating the gains from 
implementing a more efficient policy, one that targets carbon reductions at the field scale 
but requires accurate field-scale measurement technology, relative to a practice-based 
policy that can be implemented in the absence of such technology. We find large cost 
savings due to improved targeting of conservation tillage subsidies for the state of Iowa. 
The cost savings depend significantly on the choice of baseline carbon, while the ability 
of the government to cost discriminate has little impact on the value of accurate 
measurement technology. 
 
Keywords: carbon sequestration, green payment policy, value of measurement 
technology. 
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Introduction 
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution continues to be a major source of environ-
mental degradation in many areas of the United States. As argued in Millock, Sunding, 
and Zilberman (2002), the major challenge for regulating nonpoint source effluents is the 
lack of accurate information and effective measurement of the emission contributions of 
individual polluters. However, the line between point and nonpoint sources is becoming 
increasingly blurred: with improved measurement technologies, traditional nonpoint 
sources can become point sources. For example, large farming operations in California 
are effectively point sources and the development of GIS technology for tracking efflu-
ents will “turn” more such nonpoint sources into point sources. Thus, the further 
development of such measurement technologies can significantly improve social welfare 
if these technologies can turn additional nonpoint to point sources. 
Unfortunately, there has not been much systematic empirical evaluation of measure-
ment technologies in the literature. The objective of this paper is to provide such an 
evaluation for technologies that can measure field-level carbon sequestration in the context 
of either a government program of terrestrial carbon sequestration or a carbon market. Such 
technologies already exist, but significant work remains,1 and Mooney et al. (2002, 2003) 
provide estimates of the current costs of certain of these sampling technologies.  
Here, we empirically estimate the value of accurate measurement technology by 
comparing the sequestered carbon levels in a practice-based subsidy policy implemented 
with and without measurement of carbon storage on individual fields. We consider four 
possible levels of measurement technology that vary in their accuracy: those that provide 
accurate measurements of soil carbon content at the field level (the most accurate), the 
county level (i.e., providing accurate county averages), the crop reporting district level, 
and finally the statewide level. Focusing on a practice-based government sponsored 
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subsidy policy, we also consider several categories of institutional constraints, including 
the choice of baseline carbon and the ability of the government to discriminate cost. 
Under each institutional setting, we identify the optimal policy design or subsidy schemes 
given the technology level. We then calculate the carbon gains and the associated 
monetized values as the technology improves. 
There has been considerable excitement in the agricultural community over the pros-
pect of utilization of agricultural soils to sequester carbon as well as to grow crops so that 
farmers could benefit economically from adopting practices that generate carbon storage. 
In a much-quoted study, Lal et al. (1998) estimate that agricultural soils in the United 
States have the potential to sequester between 75 and 208 mmt of carbon per year. While 
the exact manner in which agricultural enterprises might financially profit from adopting 
practices that sequester carbon are not yet developed, possibilities include the emergence 
of formal carbon markets and the direct payment of subsidies to farmers through a 
government program (Feng, Zhao, and Kling 2003). 
In this paper, we concentrate on a potential government program similar to the re-
cently adopted Conservation Security Program (CSP) in the 2002 farm bill where 
subsidies are paid to farmers who adopt environmentally friendly practices (U.S. Con-
gress 2002). In particular, payments could be directed toward agricultural practices 
believed to sequester carbon, such as conservation tillage. Given heterogeneity in land 
and farmer characteristics, soil quality, and weather, fields with higher sequestered 
carbon per dollar of subsidy should be targeted. However, if field-level carbon sequestra-
tion information is not available, the program has to target larger regions for which 
sequestered carbon can be measured. Targeting has been shown to produce significant 
efficiency gains in a number of cases (Parks and Hardie 1995, Pautsch et al. 2001, Antle, 
Capalbo, and Mooney 2002, Antle et al. 2003). 
We further focus on two aspects of program design that affect the gains from field-
level measurement. One is the choice of baseline: whether payment is made only for 
carbon stored above an initial baseline (perhaps the level of carbon contained in the soil 
in the year the program begins) or whether payment is based on the total amount of 
carbon stored in the soil. In the first case, previous adopters of practices that promote 
carbon storage would not be eligible for the subsidy. Limited conservation budgets favor 
Institutions and the Value of Nonpoint Source Measurement Technology / 3 
 
paying for new carbon only, but such a program would seem to penalize farmers who 
have adopted conservation tillage in the past. We consider both policy options in our 
evaluation of measurement technologies and explicitly measure the difference in the 
implied value of the measurement technology under these two institutional regimes. 
A second critical program design element is the extent to which the government can 
differentiate its payments to farmers when field-level carbon sequestration potentials are 
not known. If regulators know the average carbon sequestration level in a region (such as 
a county, watershed, or state), they may find it impractical to pay different prices for 
adopting carbon sequestration practices within those regions, even though in actuality 
farmers may have different reservation prices. While the most cost-effective program 
would target farmers who are willing to adopt at the lowest cost, such price discrimina-
tion may not be possible for several reasons. There may be information asymmetries 
wherein the government cannot determine which farmers would be willing to supply 
carbon sequestration at lower costs than others when field-scale measurement technology 
is not available. Alternatively, the government may not wish to price (or cost) discrimi-
nate even if an efficient bid system could be designed to reveal farmers’ costs, as the 
government may want to provide rents to low-cost suppliers as a form of income transfer. 
Finally, political pressures may prevent this kind of cost discrimination. 
Thus, in assessing the value of more accurate measurement technologies for carbon 
sequestration in agricultural soils, we consider four institutions, each representing a 
different combination of the design features just enumerated. They are (1) paying for all 
carbon measured in the soil versus paying only for carbon above an initial baseline, and 
(2) cost discrimination where farmers with lower opportunity costs receive lower pay-
ments versus equal payment amounts for all farmers in a geographically designated 
subset. Note that when accurate field-scale measurement technology is available, the 
ability to cost discriminate is complete, as full information on the carbon levels at the 
farm field is available to both farmers and regulators. 
Subsidy Policies under Alternative Measurement Technologies and Institutions 
Suppose there are I  farms, indexed by 1,...,i I . For farmer i, let iA  be the acreage 
of homogeneous land and let iq  be the amount of carbon that can be sequestered per acre 
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of land in conservation tillage. Let ( )ip s  be the farmer’s probability of adopting conser-
vation tillage given a per acre subsidy of s, which is observed by the government.2 We 
assume that ’ 0ip   and 
’’ 0ip   for all i: a higher subsidy raises the adoption probability 
but at a decreasing rate. Note that for some farmers, it is possible that (0) 1ip  , implying 
that even without any subsidy they find it profitable to adopt conservation tillage. 
Subsidy Policies with Accurate Field-Scale Measurement Technology 
If the regulator is able to measure the carbon levels sequestered in a field, it will be 
possible to target payments to fields that can most cost-effectively sequester carbon. 
Consider first the case of a subsidy payment for new carbon only: the regulator observes 
iq  and offers different subsidies to different farms for new lands in the sequestration 
program based on iq  and ( )ip s . Given a budget of B , the government chooses the 
payment profile 1( ,..., )Is ss  to maximize the expected amount of sequestered carbon: 
 
 
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where  ( ) (0)i i ip s p A  measures the expected new acreage in the sequestration program.3 
Let 1
I
 be the Lagrange multiplier, which measures the additional expected carbon seques-
tered when budget B increases by one unit. The subscript denotes the institution and the 
superscript “I” denotes that the regulator has accurate information about the field-scale 
carbon levels. Then the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the optimal is  are  
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Let 1 1( , 1,..., )I Iis i I s  be the optimal solutions. For all farmers with 1 0Iis  , (2) implies 
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Assumption ’’ 0ip   implies that 
’( ( ) (0)) /i i i ip s p p  increases in is  (or ip ): a farmer who 
is more willing to adopt (i.e., who has a higher probability of adoption) should receive a 
lower level of subsidy. Of course, 1
I
is  increases in iq : farmers with higher sequestration 
potential should receive higher subsidies. 
We now turn to the case where the policy includes payment for all carbon, regardless 
of whether it was sequestered prior to the initiation of the subsidy program or not.4 The 
problem becomes 
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Let 2
I  be the associated Lagrange multiplier, and 2 2( , 1,..., )I Iis i I s  the optimal solu-
tions. The optimality conditions are similar to (2), and for all farmers with 2 0Iis  , we 
know  
 2
2
2 ’
2
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I
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s
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. (5) 
Again, 2
I
is  decreases in ip : farmers with higher adoption probabilities receive lower 
payments.  
It is clear that more carbon is sequestered under (1) than under (4): essentially the 
budget level is higher by 
1
(0)
I
i i i
i
p A s
 
  if only new carbon sequestered is eligible for 
payment. 
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Subsidy Policies in the Absence of Accurate Field-Scale Measurement  
Technology 
If field-scale measurement technology of sufficient accuracy is not available to regula-
tors, the precise targeting schemes discussed in the previous section cannot be 
implemented. In this case, the regulator might divide the country or region into zones that 
are somewhat agronomically and/or ecologically similar and use the average carbon 
sequestration potential to implement policies. Possible subsets include county, crop report-
ing district, or state. Let {1,..., }I   be the entire set of farms, and , 1,...,k k K   be a 
partition of   , that is, 
1
K
k
k 
    . For each subset k  , we assume that policymakers can 
obtain accurate information about the average per acre sequestration potential 
kq
, where 
 
k
k
i i
ik
i
i
A q
q
A
 
 



 
 
. (6) 
Thus, while regulators recognize the differences in carbon sequestration across the 
subset, they must treat farms within each subset as homogeneous: kiq q  for ki
 .
5
 
The extreme case of field-level information corresponds to k  being singletons (with 
K I ), and that of no information corresponds to 1.K    
Given information represented by the partition , 1,...,k k K , we consider four pol-
icy institutions under which the regulator might choose the subsidy levels, listed in Table 
1. Under institution 1, the subsidy is for new carbon only, and even for farmers in the 
same subset k , the regulator can still differentiate subsidies based on the cost of 
adoption represented by the adoption probabilities. This might reasonably occur if a 
bidding system similar to the one used in the CRP program is used to generate bids from 
which the regulator can select farms for the program. Institution 2 is similar except that 
 
TABLE 1. The policy institutions of carbon sequestration 
 Cost Discrimination No Cost Discrimination 
Payment for new carbon Institution 1 Institution 3 
Payment for all carbon Institution 2 Institution 4 
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all land in conservation tillage receives the subsidy, regardless of when conservation 
tillage was adopted. In both cases, farmers within the same subset can receive different 
subsidies: i js s  for , ki j
 , if ( ) ( )i jp s p s . Thus, the limited information means that 
the government cannot identify and select farms that are particularly high in carbon 
sequestration for inclusion in the program, but it can select lower-cost providers. 
Under institutions 3 and 4, however, we assume that cost discrimination is not possi-
ble within a subset, because of the limited information the regulator has about 
sequestration potential. In either case, those within the same subset receive the same 
subsidy: i js s  for , ki j
 , even if ( ) ( )i jp s p s , although the subsidies can vary 
across subsets.  
Under the institution 1, given partition , 1,...,k k K , the government’s optimiza-
tion problem is similar to equation (1), except that iq  is replaced by kq  for ki
 : 
 
 
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 (7) 
Let 1
K  be the associated Lagrange multiplier, where subscript 1 denotes institution 1, 
and superscript K represents partition with K subsets (K, unlike k, is not an index). Note 
that typically 1 1
K I   for K I . Let 1 1( , , 1,..., )kK Ki k ks i k K 
 s   be the optimal 
solutions. Corresponding to (3), we know that for all 1 0kKis  , 
 1
1
1 ’
1
,    ,   1,..., .( ) (0)
( )
k k k
k
k k
k
K
k kK
i i iK
i K
i i
q i k K
p s p
s
p s
 
 

	
  (8) 
Thus, farmers in subsets with higher average sequestration potentials tend to receive 
higher subsidies, and those who are more willing to adopt conservation tillage (i.e., those 
with higher 
ki
p ) tend to receive lower subsidies. 
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Under institution 3, the government can choose only a single subsidy for farmers 
within the same subset, although subsidies can vary across subsets. The decision problem is 
 
 
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 (9) 
Let 3
K  be the associated Lagrange multiplier, where subscript 3 denotes institution 3, 
and superscript K represents partition with K subsets. Let  
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 (10) 
be the weighted average probability of adoption of subset k, and ’( ) ( ) /k kp s dp s ds . Let 
3 3( ,  , 1,..., )K ki ks s i k K  
 s   be the optimal solutions. Then, similar to (8), for all 
subsets receiving positive subsidies, 0ks  , we have 
   3
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 (11) 
Thus, subsets with a higher average level of carbon potential kq  receive higher subsidies. 
Further, ’’ 0ip   implies that 
’/k kp p  increases in ks : subsets with lower costs of adoption 
or higher ( )kp s  will receive a lower subsidy. Notice that since the subsidy can vary 
across subsets, the government factors in the probability differences across subsets in its 
optimal decision.  
The optimality conditions for institutions 2 and 4 can be developed similarly. The 
optimal subsidies are denoted as 2 2( , , 1,..., )kK Ki k ks i k K 
 s   and 
4 4( ,  , 1,..., )K ki ks s i k K  
 s   respectively. Recall that with the field-level informa-
tion, institution 1 (institution 2) is the same as institution 3 (institution 4). Thus,  
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 1 3 2 4,
I I I I s s s s . (12) 
The Value of Improved Measurement Technologies 
Regardless of the information and institutions, for a given budget level, in order to 
compare the efficiency of the various subsidy choices, we need only compare how much 
expected carbon can be sequestered. Let ( )Q s  be the expected total sequestered carbon 
given payment profile s: 
 ( ) ( )i i i i
i
Q p s A q
 
 s
 
 . (13) 
Then, given a measurement technology represented by partition { , 1,..., }k k K , the 
expected total carbon levels under institution l  is ( )KlQ s , 1,..., 4l  . The case of field-
level information under institution 1, 1Is , sequesters the maximum level of carbon, since 
by definition, 1Is  maximizes ( )Q s  given budget B. Under other institutional and informa-
tion settings, the optimal payments are limited by information about iq , cost 
discrimination, or paying for all carbon.  
For a given institution, the expected carbon ( )Q s  increases as the measurement tech-
nology improves, that is, as the partition { , 1,..., }k k K  becomes “finer” (see Appendix 
A for the proof). Under institution l, the gain from information { , 1,..., }k k K  to field-
level measurement is ( ) ( )I Kl lQ Qs s , which can be expressed in monetary terms as 
 
1
( ) ( )( ; )
I K
I K l l
l l I
Q QG



s s
s s  (14) 
where 1
I  is the Lagrange multiplier obtained in equation (1). Obviously, ( )G   decreases 
as { , 1,..., }k k K  becomes finer. 
Throughout the comparisons, we use 11/ I  to measure the marginal value of carbon 
for consistency across comparisons. This value changes as budget B varies. If there is an 
efficient carbon-trading program, we could also use the market price of carbon. Note that 
the market price should equal 11/ I  if the sequestration program is designed efficiently. 
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For a given measurement technology, we know that more carbon can be sequestered 
under institution 1 (institution 2) than under institution 3 (institution 4), because under the 
former, even within the same subset, the government can still “cost discriminate,” or 
choose payment levels based on each farmer’s adoption probability. That is, 
1 3( ) ( )K KQ Qs s  and 2 4( ) ( )K KQ Qs s  for K I . Consequently, from equations (14) and 
(12), we know 1 1 3 3( ; ) ( ; )I K I KG Gs s s s  and 2 2 4 4( ; ) ( ; )I K I KG Gs s s s : if we start with the same 
information structure, field-level measurement technologies are more valuable under 
institution 3 (institution 4) than under institution 1 (institution 2).  
Although for any given technology, the expected carbon sequestration level is higher 
under institution 1 (institution 3) than under institution 2 (institution 4), no clear-cut 
comparison can be made in terms of the value of improved technology under paying for 
all versus paying for new carbon. In fact, as we will show later, the ranking can be 
reversed as the budget level changes. 
The Interpretation of Baselines  
In the previous discussion, the regulator has been assumed to be concerned with the 
total amount of carbon sequestered after the choice of subsidies. However, in some 
contexts it will be the amount of newly sequestered carbon as a result of a particular 
policy that will be of interest to regulators.6 Notice that the same optimal payment profile 
1
Is  and marginal value of carbon 11/ I  as found in equation (1) can be obtained in the 
following setup where only new carbon sequestered is considered: 
 
 
1 1
1
       max  ( ) (0)
s.t.           ( ) (0) =B;    s 0.
I I
i i i i i i i
i i
I
i i i i i i
i
p s A q p A q
p s p A s
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 

 
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
s
 (15)  
Here, the objective function measures the net increase in the expected total carbon from 
using s  relative to no payment, or the new carbon. The term 
1
(0)I i i ii p Aq   measures the 
baseline level of carbon sequestration without any payment. Similarly, under other 
informational and institutional settings, we can subtract the baseline carbon in the objec-
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tive function and obtain the same optimal payment profiles. Thus, the choice of the 
baseline carbon level in the objective function simply reflects an accounting issue and 
does not affect the optimal payment profile, the marginal value of additional sequestered 
carbon, or the value of improved measurement technologies. In contrast, whether the 
government pays only for the new carbon or for all carbon does affect these values. When 
existing adopters of conservation tillage receive payments under a carbon program, less 
of the budget will remain for the purchase of new carbon and therefore less total (and 
new) carbon will be sequestered.  
 
Empirical Models and Data 
In this section, we describe the empirical analysis that we rely on to obtain the adop-
tion probabilities ( )ip s  and the carbon potential iq , which we use in the next section to 
simulate the consequences of the various subsidy policies and to compute the value of 
improved measurement technology. We obtain the adoption probabilities from an eco-
nomic model of conservation tillage adoption, while we used carbon potentials obtained 
from a physical process model. The set of farms   contains some 13,345 National 
Resource Inventory (NRI) (USDA-SCS 1994) points for the state of Iowa.  
To obtain the adoption probabilities, we draw on the work of Kurkalova, Kling, and 
Zhao (2003), which presents empirical estimates of a reduced-form, discrete-choice 
adoption model for conservation tillage in Iowa. The Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao model 
assumes that a farmer will adopt conservation tillage if the expected annual net return to 
using conservation tillage ( 1 ) exceeds the expected net return from using conventional 
tillage ( 0 ) plus the premiums associated with uncertainty 2 21 2( , , )P   z , which in turn 
depends on the variability of the net returns to conservation tillage, 21 , conventional 
tillage, 20 , and other explanatory variables (z). With the addition of a standard economet-
ric stochastic component with variance,  , the probability that a farmer will adopt 
conservation tillage can be written as7 
   2 21 0 1 2Pr Pr ( ) ( , , )adopt P       	 	 x z . 
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For the purposes of our study, we utilize the ability of this model to predict the prob-
ability of adoption in response to a subsidy. In particular, the adoption probability of 
farmer i is 
 
 
 
1, 0,
1, 0,
1
exp
( )
11 exp
i i i i
i i
i i i i
s P
p s
s P
 

 

 	   
 
 	 	   
 
. (16) 
The field-specific potential of soil to sequester carbon, iq , was estimated at each of 
the data points using the Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model, version 
1015 (Izaurralde et al. 2002)8. The simulations were carried out at a field-scale level for 
areas homogeneous in weather, soil, landscape, crop rotation, and management system 
parameters. Version 1015 of EPIC includes an updated (relative to earlier versions) 
carbon simulation routine that is based on the approach used in the Century model 
developed by Parton et al. (1994).  
At each of the data points, two 30-year simulations were run, one under conventional 
tillage and the other assuming conservation tillage. The NRI database provided the land 
use and other input data for the simulations. We computed the quantity iq  as the differ-
ence between soil carbon content under conservation tillage and that under conventional 
tillage, averaged over the 30 years. Figure 1 shows a plot of carbon sequestration poten-
tial data for Iowa, where counties with different carbon sequestration potentials are 
highlighted by a color scheme. For the state as a whole, the average q  is 0.203 
ton/acre/year (with the associated standard deviation being 0.095). 
As previously noted, the basic data come from the NRI (Nusser and Goebel 1997). For 
the purposes of our estimation, we treat each NRI point as representing a producer with a 
farm size iA  equal to the number of acres represented by the NRI expansion factor.  
 
Results 
For each of the subsidy schemes and institutions described earlier, the regulator’s 
problem of maximizing the total new expected carbon sequestration subject to the 
budget constraint was solved numerically using the data for I=13,345 Iowa NRI points.  
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FIGURE 1. Per county average carbon sequestration potential, tons per acre per year 
 
We considered 20 levels of potential budgets, based on the budget amount from  the federal 
funding that might be available to Iowa through the CSP.9 At each of the budget levels, we 
computed the expected quantity of carbon sequestration ( )KlQ s under institution l and 
partition with K subsets. Here , 99, 9, 1K I  correspond to four levels of measurement 
available: field level ( K I ), county level ( 99K  ), crop reporting district level ( 9K  ), 
or state level ( 1K  ). The details of computations are provided in Appendix B. 
Figure 2 compares the marginal costs of carbon sequestration under institutions 1 and 
2 given field-scale measurement, 11/
I and 21/
I . As expected, the marginal costs are 
lower when only new adopters are being paid. We estimate that some 500,000 mt of carbon 
can be sequestered annually at the marginal cost of $30 per mt if new adopters are being 
paid only, and at the marginal cost of almost $100 per mt if all adopters are being paid. 
Figure 3 depicts the amount of new carbon obtainable annually, 99( )lQ s , under the 
four institutions ( 1, 2,3,4l  ), assuming that only county-level information is available. 
As with the marginal costs, who is being paid makes a crucial difference in the amount 
of sequestered carbon. The ability of a policy to cost discriminate has a relatively small 
impact on the amount sequestered when who is being paid is held constant, as 992( )Q s is 
very similar to 994( )Q s , and 991( )Q s is virtually indistinguishable from 993( )Q s in Figure 2.  
To assess the value of field-level monitoring technology, Figure 4 presents the car-
bon benefits associated with moving from county-level targeting ( 99K  ) to field-scale 
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FIGURE 2. Marginal cost of carbon sequestration under alternative policy regimes 
and full information on field-level carbon sequestration potential 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Carbon sequestration with county-level information 
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FIGURE 4. Carbon gain due to field-level information as opposed to county-level 
information 
 
targeting. As expected at all budget levels,        99 991 1 3 3I IQ Q Q Q  s s s s  (diamonds 
versus squares, payment to new adopters only) and        99 992 2 4 4I IQ Q Q Q  s s s s  
(triangles versus circles, payment to all adopters). Interestingly, the ranking of the 
policies when all are paid versus when only new adopters are paid depends on the budget 
level. At low levels of the budget, the carbon gain is higher for the policies that pay new 
adopters only, that is,        99 994 4 3 3I IQ Q Q Q  s s s s  (without cost discrimination) and 
       99 992 2 1 1I IQ Q Q Q  s s s s  (with cost discrimination), while at the higher levels the 
ranking is reversed. As Figure 4 shows, the reversal occurs at around $5 million for no 
cost discrimination policies (circles versus squares), and at around $16 million for cost 
discriminating policies (triangles versus diamonds).  
These results suggest that the value of improved measurement technology depends 
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not only on which policy institution is chosen to implement increased carbon sequestra-
tion but also on the overall sequestration level. If agriculture plays a significant role in 
addressing the atmospheric accumulation of carbon, the budget level will need to be set 
relatively high, in which case the greatest benefits to improved measurement technology 
will occur if a policy that pays all adopters is chosen. If soil carbon sequestration is to 
play only a small part in the overall basket of carbon reduction strategies, the optimally 
chosen carbon sequestration budget will be low and the value of improved measurement 
technology will be highest under a policy that pays only new adopters. 
Finally, we computed the monetary valuation of the gain in carbon due to better 
measurement technologies using equation (14). Note that this valuation assumes that the 
sequestration program is designed efficiently and thus the social marginal value of carbon 
reductions equals 11/ I . The estimated cost savings for institutions 1 and 4 are provided 
in Figure 5 and suggest a high monetary value associated with investing in field-scale 
measurement technology. These cost savings range anywhere from 11.2 percent of the 
total budget to over 47.3 percent.10 
 
Conclusions 
Accurate technology for field-scale carbon assessment is a necessary ingredient for the 
implementation of policies that target subsidy payments to farms that provide the greatest 
carbon benefits per dollar spent. The development of such technology will allow the 
implementation of more efficient policies than can be implemented in their absence. This 
observation forms the basis for estimating the benefits of developing field-scale measure-
ment technology for carbon sequestration. Since the availability of such technology would 
allow the adoption of more efficient policies, the cost savings associated with these policies 
can be viewed as the value of the improved technology. If the cost savings are high, it 
would be socially worthwhile to invest significantly in the development of such technolo-
gies. If the cost savings are low, significant investment would not be warranted. 
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FIGURE 5. Cost savings due to availability of field-level carbon sequestration 
information under alternative subsidy institutions 
 
In this study, we estimated relatively large cost savings for improved targeting of 
conservation tillage subsidy policies in Iowa. In the absence of field-scale measurement  
technologies, up to 64 percent less carbon can be sequestered than if field-scale meas-
urement technology is available. In monetary terms, this translates into cost savings of 
over $612,000. 
Also of note is the important role that the payment of subsidies to existing providers 
of carbon sequestration can have, both in the value of the technological improvements 
and in the overall amount of carbon sequestration that can be purchased with a given 
budget. More than any other policy dimension we investigated, this design feature of a 
subsidy program will significantly affect its efficacy in terms of carbon storage.  
The results are influenced by the variability among producers in terms of the costs of 
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conservation tillage adoption and/or in terms of the carbon sequestration potential. 
Consequently, the results may not transfer immediately to other regions. However, there 
is little reason to think that Iowa is more heterogeneous than other regions in terms of its 
suitability for carbon sequestration; thus, there may be many locations that will exhibit 
even higher returns from improved measurement technology than those found here. 
The models and results presented here suggest a number of important areas for future 
research. A variety of other policy approaches for encouraging soil carbon sequestration 
are possible, including carbon markets, taxes, and hybrids, and these approaches in turn 
affect the value of carbon measurement technology. Assessing the value of these tech-
nologies under the alternatives of interest to policymakers would be a valuable addition 
to the current results. Likewise, it would be valuable to study the optimal mechanism 
given a particular level of technological measurement accuracy. As the technology 
improves and the spatial accuracy of measurement improves, it may be optimal to change 
the structure of the policy mechanism.
  
Endnotes 
1. See, for example, project summaries from the multi-institutional research project, 
Consortium for the Agricultural Soils Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases, available 
online at www.casmgs.colostate.edu.   
2. For simplicity, we do not consider private information on the cost of adoption. 
Presumably, the government can use a bidding mechanism like that in the Conserva-
tion Reserve Program (CRP) enrollment through which farmers fully reveal their 
private information on adoption costs. 
3. We implicitly assume that the costs of applying the measurement technology are not 
part of the budget constraint. In measuring soil carbon, a promising technology is 
GIS based where the variable cost of applying the technology is low. 
4. The regulator is thus paying for both previous acreage that sequestered carbon and 
any initial levels of carbon sequestered in fields that newly adopted sequestering 
practices provide. 
5. This is conceptually similar to emission based permit systems when pollution 
damage varies spatially and trades are allowed on a one-to-one basis within pre-
defined zones. See Baumol and Oates 1988. 
6. For example, carbon sinks in agricultural soils met with some substantial skepticism 
internationally during the Kyoto discussion as some expressed concern that carbon 
already stored below ground might be claimed to satisfy the targets. 
7. Definitions of the data as well as parameter estimates are provided in Kurkalova, 
Kling, and Zhao 2003. 
8. Earlier versions of EPIC were called the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator 
(Williams 1990). 
9. The CSP of the 2002 farm bill provides $2 billion for five years (U.S. Congress 
2002). Even if Iowa crop producers get one-tenth of the yearly total, the program 
funding is limited to $40 million per year. 
10. It is important to keep in mind that the values reported in Figure 5 refer to the cost 
savings that could be accrued in the state of Iowa alone. Assuming that the develop-
ment of such technology that is appropriate for Iowa would also be appropriate for 
other states and regions, the full benefits are likely to be much larger.
   
 
Appendix A 
The Positive Value of Improved Measurement Technology 
To show that ( )Q   increases when partition { , 1,..., }k k K  becomes finer, con-
sider, without loss of generality, institution 1. Note that the optimization problem in 
equation (1) can be transformed to  
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  is the total acreage, and /i i iA q A   is farm i’s “share” of the total 
carbon potential of all farms. Since 
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as probabilities, and (A.1) as maximization of a certain expected value.  
Now consider partition { , 1,..., }k k K . Corresponding to equation (6), we can      
define  
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where /kj jA q A  , kj
 . Equation (A.2) measures the share of farm ki  belonging to 
subset k, in the total carbon potential. Notice that 
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i  utilizes carbon information of 
subset k only, and 
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 
. Then equation (7) can be rewritten as  
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 (A.3) 
Equation (A.2) shows that ( , 1,..., )i i I   is sufficient for ( , , 1,..., )kki k ki k K 
  : 
the latter in a subset is a weighted average of the former in that subset. Then Blackwell’s 
Theorem implies that the former is more informative, or the payoff in (A.1) is higher than 
in (A.3) (Kihlstrom 1984).  
Similarly, we can compare two partitions: partition { , 1,..., }k k K  is finer than 
{ , 1,..., ’}k k K  if the former is a subset of the latter. Then, repeating the previous 
procedure, we can show that the expected carbon under the former is higher. This result 
also holds true under other institutions. 
  
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Details on Computations 
Given budget level B, the numerical solution to problem (1) (or (4), (7), or (9), de-
pending on the informational and institutional settings) was found using the Secant 
algorithm (see, for example, Burden and Faires1985). Specifically, we started with the first 
approximation, (1) , and solved the equations in (3) (or (5), (8), or (11), respectively) with 
the right-hand side equal to (1)  for (1)is  at each data point i  for which the solution exists. 
The cost of the policy at the solution (1)s  was compared to the budget level B. If the relative 
difference between the cost and the budget was less than a chosen tolerance level, then the 
value of (1)  was accepted as the solution. Otherwise, we repeated the procedure of finding 
the solution (2)s  of the set of equations (3) (or (5), (8), or (11), respectively) for the second 
approximation, (2) . Again, if the relative error in matching the budget was less than the 
tolerance level, the value of (2)  was accepted as the solution. Otherwise, the   was 
updated using the Secant method and the procedure of updating   and finding the corre-
sponding solution s  was repeated until the relative difference between two consecutive 
approximations to   was within a chosen tolerance level. 
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